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Despite the dismantling of physical borders in 
the European Union, opportunities for cross-border 
activities are only partially exploited. According to 
Yoder for instance “despite the expansion of the 
opportunity structure for greater German-Polish 
cross-border cooperation, interaction still tends to be 
among elites” [29, p. 119]. This makes it the more 
necessary to study the attitudes and perceptions of local 
and regional elites who are in a position to shape such 
contacts. An important challenge when interviewing 
elites is obtaining “the interviewees’ own perception of 
events and not the “public relations” version of a story, 
which they think the interviewer would want to hear” 
[15, p. 485]. 
This article aims at contributing to the debate 
on the researcher’s positionality by showing the 
outsider’s advantage in eliciting elite standpoints 
beyond the official discourses of integration and cross-
border cooperation. I will do this by presenting and 
critically reflecting on our interviewees’ accounts of 
these issues. This can be done by carefully listening to 
“what is said, how it is said and what is not mentioned 
at all, what subjects are strengthened in discourse and 
what others are suppressed, highlight and indicate 
personal and/or shared motivations and values, 
dependencies and structures of power” [6, p. 364, 
original emphasis]. We begin by discussing the debate 
on the researcher’s positionality in elite interviews, and 
in particular the insider/outsider dilemma. 
 
2. THE RESEARCHER’S POSITION IN ELITE 
INTERVIEWS 
 
There has been a debate in the literature on 
the researcher’s role as an insider vs. outsider in data-
gathering generally, but also in elite interviews 
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As conducting interviews with elites is increasingly common, an important debate has emerged around the researcher’s positionality as 
an insider/outsider also in a geographic sense. Three standpoints can be distinguished. Initially, some emphasised the advantages of the 
insider in eliciting interesting and sometimes even sensitive information from informants. More recently, several scholars suggested 
that this position is never stable. Our experiences are however more in line with those who demonstrated the advantages of being an 
outsider. Coming from outside the study area may be particularly helpful when interviewing elites on sensitive issues such as contacts in 
a borderland with a troubled history, like between Poland and Germany. Our 38 interviews reveal three patterns. First, blaming the 
other side is not unusual on both sides of the border. Second, de-emphasising the importance of cooperation is more common on the 
Polish side, but also occurred on the German side. Finally, a discourse of re-establishing the historically coherent region is clearly 
present on the German side, but lacks almost entirely on the Polish side. It is doubtful whether we would have been able to elicit such 
attitudes from both studied groups had we belonged to either one of them. 
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specifically. Outsiderness can of course refer to several 
aspects: those often dealt with include professional 
background [12, p. 323-324], age [24], [11, p. 198], race, 
class, gender, ethnicity [16], and the amount of time the 
researcher spends with the interviewees [12, p. 317]. 
To begin with, as academics our professional 
background is usually different from our interviewees’; 
since publications and presentations are the main 
means of exchange, it is relatively uncommon for 
scholars to interview other researchers. In our case, we 
actually included a few academics among our 
interviewees, though this was also related to the relative 
difficulties of finding earlier studies from our study 
area.  
When it comes to age, Sabot was able to 
interact somewhat easier with interviewees of her age 
than with older ones [24, p. 333]. This aspect is more 
difficult in our case to make a statement about, as the 
age-span within our group varied between 25 and 65 
years. But the fact that our team consisted of several 
researchers including two professors may certainly have 
functioned as a “gate-opener”. ‘Race’ is a term and an 
identity-marker not commonly used in Europe, but I 
am providing some reflections on ethnicity below. 
While ‘class’ is also a difficult concept that is best 
treated in relative terms, our interviewees did not 
include actors identified by some as ‘ultra-elites’ [30], 
[26]. Another aspect in which we were more often 
‘insiders’ than not is that of gender, since the majority 
of our interviewees belonged to the same sex as us, that 
is male. This was difficult to avoid given the gendered 
elite landscape in Central Europe: in practice, our male 
interviewees were in some cases accompanied by female 
colleagues, but often clearly younger and much lower 
positioned (like assistant, trainee or similar). Sabot 
found that “[g]ender factors do matter but it seems that 
it becomes secondary to other positional factors, like 
being a local researcher” [24, p. 334]. In the end, 
gender-issues did not constitute the primary focus in 
our interview topics. 
Our interest lay in issues related to ethnicity, 
an aspect that largely distinguished us from our 
interviewees and one that will receive most attention in 
the remainder of this paper. True, some interviewers 
also experienced their ethnic outsiderness as shifting 
[16], sometimes even consciously and strategically 
playing with being for example British or American [12, 
pp. 321-322]; but such attempts to represent oneself in 
ways that render one “as either a partial ‘insider’ or 
‘outsider’, had its share of ethical dilemmas” [16, p. 347; 
see also 12, p. 323]. Finally, one can gradually become 
an insider by meeting the interviewees several times, to 
the extent of developing sympathy [15, p. 490] or even 
becoming friends [12, p. 317]. Since we only met four of 
our interviewees twice, we did not enjoy such an 
opportunity or ran this risk. The arguments made thus 
far on the outsider’s position can be put into three 
groups. Especially earlier, some scholars argued that 
‘insiders’ – i.e. researchers who study a group to whom 
they belong – have an advantage because they are able 
to use their knowledge of the group to gain more 
intimate insights into their opinions[1], [13]. Rivera et 
al. for instance were conscious of “a general suspicion of 
foreigners” in Russia [22, p. 683]. 
More recently, a consensus has been emerging 
on the relativity of outsiderness [5, p. 263], [20, p. 480]. 
Thus, Herod talks of “’degrees of outsiderness’ in which 
there is a continuum of outsiderness along which 
researchers operate” [12, p. 326]. For Mullings, the 
binary implied in the ‘insider/outsider’ debates … is less 
than real because it seeks to freeze positionalities in 
place, and assumes that being an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ is 
a fixed attribute [16, p. 340]. The ‘insider/outsider’ 
binary in reality is a boundary that is not only highly 
unstable but also one that ignores the dynamism of 
positionalities in time and through space. No individual 
can consistently remain an insider and few ever remain 
complete outsiders. 
While this approach of toning down a strict 
distinction between being an insider or outsider may be 
relevant in many cases, it is less so in others. Some of its 
proponents have accounted for their personal ties to the 
national groups they were studying [e.g. 11, p. 198], [15, 
pp. 489-490], which are of course not there in all 
interview situations. 
Hence, the previous approach needs to be 
complemented with accounts of cases where 
researchers were clearly geographical outsiders and 
experienced to have benefited from it, as we did. Several 
scholars felt namely that by not belonging to a group 
under study, they are more likely to be perceived as 
neutral and therefore be given information that would 
not be given to an insider [7]. Herod found that he 
received a warmer reception as an outsider conducting 
research on trade union officials in Eastern Europe than 
as an insider in the US: “the very fact that I had 
travelled several thousand miles to talk with them may 
have led the Czech and Slovak trade unionists to take 
me more seriously because I myself had obviously put 
in a great deal of effort to get there” [12, p. 317]. 
Further, he felt that his position precisely as an 
“outsider” has sometimes positively helped in the 
research process because it has allowed him to appear 
as a “neutral” or “impartial” observer of events” [12, p. 
322]. 
Among those acknowledging the foreign 
outsider’s advantages Sabot’s study is of particular 
interest, for two reasons [24]. First, she did fieldwork 
within the framework of the same study in her native 
city in France and two other cities in Scotland, gaining 
her experiences both as an insider and as an outsider. 
Second, her study is a rare case since she had the 
chance to verify her observation of the outsider 
advantage by meeting an American colleague, who 
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happened to be asking the same questions from the 
same elites in the same French city, in the same time 
period. Her conclusions are clear: Local elites distribute 
their knowledge very differently to foreign or local 
researchers. … foreigners are given more information as 
they easily generate confidence in local elites. … a 
foreigner is more likely to gain access more quickly to 
higher echelons and to be given more sensitive 
information. She/He is also able to circumnavigate 
cultural taboos whereas the local researcher is tied by 
his/her own culture… thus the foreign researcher is 
allowed to ask almost anything. Conversely, a local 
researcher has to expend effort and time networking 
through the hierarchy and, even then, may not gain 
access to the crucial information influencing decision-
making [24, p. 334]. 
Apart from some reasons mentioned above, an 
important explanation given by foreign researchers for 
their special treatment is that they are perceived as less 
of a “threat” to local elites since they rarely return [24, 
p. 332] or share the gained information with other local 
actors [12, p. 323]. As a foreigner, it is also easier to 
“play dumb” in interviews and thereby elicit more 
sensitive information [12, pp. 322]. The empirical 
chapter will present some examples of the above that 
we encountered. 
 
3. GERMAN-POLISH CROSS-BORDER 
COOPERATION IN THE EYES OF LOCAL ELITES 
 
The empirical material is based on our 
interviews with 38 local and regional elites conducted 
during the years 2008-2010 on both sides of the 
German-Polish border (see Figure 1).  
The chosen area is of particular interest as a 
large Polish city (Szczecin, >400,000 inhabitants) is 
directly bordering a much more sparsely populated 
German region (Vorpommern) characterised by 
emigration. This situation coupled with the gradual 
opening of the physical border could at least 
hypothetically imply an increased incentive for 
cooperation [14], as evidenced elsewhere in Europe [4]. 
One hampering factor however is the area’s 
contested history [19], with the centuries-long German 
majority population expelled after WW II, leading to 
German hesitancies to recognise the border up until the 
early 1990s. 
A majority of our interviewees consisted of 
local and regional administrators in key positions 
(especially planners, but also mayors, project managers, 
etc.), with the rest being academics, businesspeople, 
journalists, and a headmaster. They included actors 
involved in various institutionalised forms of cross-
border cooperation, and others that were not. The 
interviews were conducted during a number of 
fieldtrips undertaken in the area, by visiting one 
interviewee after the other. As in Herod’s case, the fact 
that we travelled a long distance to meet them in their 
offices may well have contributed to their great 
willingness to cooperate: only two persons (a politician 
and a journalist) did not show up, and in both cases the 
meeting should have taken place in a restaurant rather 
than their offices [12, p. 317]. As another sign of 
success, in quite a few cases we were referred to other 
respondents at the end of the interview [10, p. 434]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The northern half of the German-Polish 
borderland [31]. 
 
As introductory warm-up questions, we 
usually asked more generally about what kind of cross-
border projects they knew of in the region, if any [10, p. 
437]. These included tourism-related activities, river 
landscapes, integrated coastal management, transport 
infrastructure, and cultural and educational exchanges. 
We then gradually moved towards more sensitive 
questions on the subjective experiences of cooperation. 
A number of patterns emerge from the gained 
material. In particular, blaming the other side of the 
border (actors or institutions) is quite common when 
cooperation has been challenging or a particular project 
could not be implemented as smoothly as expected. 
Unlike with non-elites [2], such attitudes are of course 
expressed less explicitly and in a different language by 
elites (even if some more direct accusations will also be 
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presented). But when one takes a careful look at the 
material in its entirety, the interviewees’ national bias 
often becomes obvious. Hence, responsibility for 
difficulties or sometimes even outright failures are more 
often transferred to the other side, whereas successes 
more commonly associated with the achievements of 
the own country. This is interesting as realising cross-
border projects always needs at least some involvement 
from both sides. 
Thus a German transport project manager 
somewhat proudly pointed out that the recent extension 
of the Usedomer Bäderbahn (UBB, the railway network 
on the divided island of Usedom) into Świnoujście 
represents the first German infrastructure project on 
Polish soil, while no Polish means of transport are so far 
operating on the German side. We also learned from 
another German transport project manager, that this 
undertaking was not without difficulties: both sides 
were sceptical at the beginning, not least regarding the 
financing. In the end 90 per cent of the investment was 
realised from European money; the rest was ‘a pure 
German investment, entirely according to German 
prescriptions’. Indeed, the Polish State Railways (PKP) 
did not have anything against this. But while some 
Polish politicians were positive, others were more 
sceptical and tried to pose unrealistic demands, such as 
financing the building of roads, a school or a 
kindergarten in Świnoujście, or even a tunnel between 
the city and the entirely Polish island of Wolin (see 
Figure 1). The German transport project manager 
concludes that ‘such mentality is different and alien to 
Germans’. Another German officer deeply involved in 
cross-border issues told us Świnoujście’s mayor was 
forbidden from above from attending the opening 
ceremony of the new border-crossing railway. 
Nevertheless, the project is seen as a success and there 
are plans for the UBB’s further expansion inside the 
Polish territory. However, a Polish official told us that 
Świnoujście’s administration is not sure whether it 
would like this to happen. She also mentioned that the 
German part has difficulties attracting money for 
building the second phase. What she did not say is 
whether the Polish side made any efforts to achieve this 
(even if it did). Overall, a German real-estate agent 
believed the island of Usedom will grow together, but so 
far most Germans consider the German part only, with 
Świnoujście being marketed as ‘Polish Baltic coast’. 
When for instance an agent advertises an object under 
the category Ahlbeck (a famous high-end seaside resort 
on the German side of the border) and clients discover 
that it is in Świnoujście, this is apparently not accepted. 
According to a German officer deeply involved 
in cross-border issues, in the early 1990s, Poland 
regarded cross-border cooperation as a tool of re-
Germanisation; thus Szczecin did not really take up the 
role as a cross-border regional centre. He believes the 
basic fear remains with Poles whether Szczecin will 
return to Germany. He noted that Warsaw, but also his 
Land (state) Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, wanted to 
avoid alienating the borderland further from their 
respective territories. Thus while successive Polish 
governments have talked of investing in Szczecin, little 
was done so far. The (German) motorways do not 
continue after Szczecin, and the city’s links with central 
Poland are given priority. As a confirmation of a fear of 
a ‘German return’ still being present in Poland, a Polish 
academic mentioned a case of a recent court decision 
approving a German citizen’s claim to her former 
property near Gdańsk. He further noted the peculiarity 
that Szczecin is now considered as a domestic 
destination by Deutsche Bahn (DB), the German 
national railway company. 
As a further illustration of the challenges with 
cross-border developments, two German public officers 
mentioned the planned establishment of a local branch 
of the University of Szczecin on the German side (which 
would be the first division of a Polish university abroad) 
is since some years delayed by the hesitancy of Polish 
authorities. This is so despite the university’s space-
problems and the German side having an oversupply of 
spacious buildings. At another meeting, a German 
expert blamed Polish administrators for making 
planning mistakes, for instance of motorways. 
According to a German politician of a 
mainstream party, “the Poles want to make money from 
the cooperation”, without reflecting over whether such 
incentives could also exist on the German side. He 
further believed the Protestant-Catholic divide is 
important, and saw Poland as a nationalist country. The 
interviewee judged that “cultural differences do exist 
and Polish culture is sometimes alien to Germans”. He 
also informed us about a recent scandal involving a 
Polish entrepreneur driving his products across the 
border to put the label ‘Made in Germany’ on them, 
adding that such cases get picked by the radicals. On 
this issue, he noted “not all local voters of the far right 
are Nazis, but rather dissatisfied”. Irrespectively of to 
what extent this comment is valid, it can be seen as a 
strategy to de-emphasise the dangers with the far right 
in Vorpommern, a region described by a Polish 
respondent as a headquarter of the German far right 
[23]. In a somewhat similar vein, a German mayor 
acknowledged there are problems with the far right in 
his town, but added the sometimes exaggerated image 
of anti-Polish vandalism as transmitted by media 
throughout Poland as another problem. A Polish official 
deeply engaged in cross-border cooperation described 
the problem with the German far right more in details, 
telling us about how some were damaging cars with 
Polish number plates etc. However, she also added that 
such incidents were vigorously reported upon on Polish 
national television, imaginably influencing the whole 
nation’s image of ‘the Germans’, the challenges of open 
borders, and even that of the European integration. 
The Outsider Advantage. Interviewing Planners and Other Elites in the Polish-German Borderland 




There were a number of further utterances 
illustrating the blaming of the other side that also 
reflect the standpoint of the respective national 
government. Thus a group of local Polish 
administrators talked negatively about Nord Stream (a 
German-Russian gas pipeline bypassing Poland through 
the Baltic Sea), emphasising the environmental 
controversies around it. At the same time, we learn 
from a Polish regional marketing officer that Poland 
wants to import gas from Norway, via a pipeline 
through Sweden and similarly through the Baltic Sea. 
Another Polish civil servant noticed some concern on 
the Polish side for Germany recently making a decision, 
without consulting the Poles, on a new coal-fired power 
station to be located near Poland. 
Another somewhat related type of comments 
in the interviews was those de-emphasising the 
importance of cross-border cooperation in the region 
(whether legitimately or not). This was particularly – 
though not exclusively – common with Polish 
interviewees. Thus a Polish academic saw little potential 
in the direct environs of Szczecin, mostly due to the 
limited human activity there. He instead emphasised 
the importance of connections to other large cities, 
especially Berlin; though even the latter not for itself 
but for Szczecin’s contacts with the rest of the world 
(e.g. through Berlin’s airports). He judged that from an 
economic perspective the links with Hamburg and 
Copenhagen are of higher significance, referring to 
Stouffer who argued that the physically proximate is not 
always the most obvious choice [27]. According to the 
Polish researcher, there are more studies on the 
German-Polish borderland in Germany than in Poland 
– “there is not much to research about”. Further, he 
shared a Polish regional marketing officer’s view that 
there is more competition than cooperation between the 
two sides of this border. German medical tourists come 
to the Polish side for the prices mainly. While the Polish 
scholar recognised this industry as a good potential for 
the region, he added there are for instance 
communication-problems between Germans and Poles, 
with the latter often choosing English before German as 
their first foreign language. The few who learn German 
do it to receive well-paying customers. 
That English is much more popular on the 
Polish side could not just be confirmed by us but also by 
a group of Polish officers deeply involved in cross-
border cooperation, who thought this depended on 
Polish students’ perception of their neighbouring 
German area as poor and lacking perspectives. The 
officers further mentioned there are fewer common 
projects now than a few years ago, which can be due to 
the more intensive attention to cooperation around the 
time of Poland’s EU-accession (in 2004). 
According to a Polish regional policy-chief 
fairs are occasionally organised together, but little else 
(e.g. no industrial parks or cross-border 
agglomerations). Even while there are no demands 
from Warsaw, the Polish border region prioritises 
developing along a north-south rather than an east-west 
axis (i.e. towards Germany). This was confirmed by 
another group of administrators in Szczecin, the city 
which even hosts the technical secretariat of the Central 
European Transport Corridor [3], a north-south axis. 
Yet another Polish administrator confirmed that 
contacts with the direct German neighbourhood are not 
very tight. 
But at least two German interviewees where 
also de-emphasising the importance of cooperation 
with the Polish side. According to an academic, little 
exchange is taking place between his organisation and 
its counterpart in Szczecin. They are occasionally 
meeting spatial planners from the Polish side but what 
usually happens is “they are chatting a bit and 
exchanging name cards, but little more than that”. He 
even found that cross-border projects are concentrated 
around a narrow elite that tends to allocate resources to 
actors within the network. Another German actor 
deeply involved in cross-border cooperation was 
sceptical about the future of Szczecin, referring to the 
challenges in front of the city’s major employers such as 
the shipyard or the university. 
A final pattern in the interview material is the 
explicit reference to the borderland as one common or 
shared region, not just in historical but even in present 
terms. While historical consciousness is strong in both 
countries (illustrated by a German interviewee’s 
reference to the over sixty-year-old German-Polish 
neighbourhood in the region as relatively new), this 
particular notion was only – and often unreflectively – 
used by German interviewees. It should be noted that 
we did not particularly ask any interviewee about the 
area’s history, but were most likely given such 
information since a) they found it important, and/or b) 
they believed we as outsiders lacked basic knowledge of 
these aspects. Once an interviewee started talking about 
history, however, we did of course in no way try to 
divert them, as each version or period of history 
accounted for is crucial for understanding the local 
elites’ perception of their native area. 
Thus a mayor started the interview by 
emphasising that historically his town had always lived 
with and from Szczecin. According to another civil 
servant, “economically this is one area”. Two more 
public officers reminded us that what today remains of 
the German side had belonged to the urban hinterland 
of Szczecin before the war: “we want to re-establish this 
as one region centred around Szczecin, restore the 
infrastructure, roads, and bicycle paths”. However, they 
find there are still problems with human relations, with 
strong national feelings in Poland and xenophobia on 
the German side. They therefore thought that “on both 
sides, we have to realise that this is one, shared region 
of Europe”. 
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In a similar vein, another actor deeply involved 
in cross-border projects said “one goal is to reconstruct 
the old infrastructure such as the Berlin-Świnoujście 
railway, which once took two hours to travel”. He also 
referred to a report on an integrated transport plan for 
Usedom and the Polish island of Wolin [21], financed by 
Germany’s Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and 
Urban Development. According to a representative of 
another town, “Szczecin is still the capital of Pomerania, 
although not formally”. He told us the local expellee 
commemoration stone is a private initiative to promote 
cooperation with the present population of formerly 
German areas. While this motivation might have been 
present, the stone actually commemorates expellees 
from formerly German territories only (see Figure 2), 
rather than for instance all victims of the post-war 




Fig. 2. A commemoration stone for expellees on the 
German side of the border (Photo by Thomas Lundén). 
 
Still, two German interviewees were more 
reflective with using the notion of a shared region. One 
of them mentioned that the term ‘Pomerania’ is still 
politically loaded. But he also emphasised that around 
60 per cent of the inhabitants in his town have an 
expellee-background (he must have included their 
descendants), with many originating from Szczecin but 
also from the former East Prussia. Further, these 
associations shall be working for reconciliation; with 
members travelling to Poland and meeting the people 
that replaced them (or more likely their descendants), 
but also ethnic Germans and Kashubs, giving them 
presents, books etc. Another actor deeply engaged in 
cross-border cooperation mentioned rhetorical 
mistakes have been committed; with the ‘Oder-region’ 
for instance later renamed as ‘Oder-partnership’. 
As an illustrative counter-narrative, a Polish 
academic talked of a “pioneer approach” to the region 
as important for understanding it. This perspective 
highlights that Poles are still relatively new to Szczecin: 
even Smolensk (today in Russia) was Polish for a longer 
time – although adding that today nobody would claim 
it to be that. Thus the border mentality is very 




Unlike some European border cities such as 
Lille [18], Basel [28], or Bratislava [9], Szczecin is not 
located in a region where “a cross-border regional 
system structured as a network of high-density towns 
located close together” can be easily developed [18, p. 
1]. Several of our interviewees expressed that the two 
sides directly at the border have little to offer each 
other. As shown, several Polish informants emphasised 
instead on the importance of Szczecin’s links to other 
larger European cities. It is therefore not unlikely that 
this and other places in the borderland will further 
deepen types of cooperation not based on adjacent 
territories such as town twinning, which may also be 
more rooted in bottom-up initiatives [8]. 
Yet apart from structural reasons, attitudes of 
local elites are at least as important in explaining levels 
of cross-border cooperation. Our interviews reveal three 
patterns. First, blaming the other side is not unusual on 
both sides of the border. Second, de-emphasising the 
importance of cooperation is more common on the 
Polish side, but occurred also on the German side. 
Finally, the discourse of re-establishing the historically 
coherent region is clearly present on the German side, 
but lacks almost entirely on the Polish side. The study 
thus confirms that borders survive in attitudes, 
narratives and discourses even once the physical 
barriers have been lifted [17, p. 152], [25, p. 235]. 
Moreover, being outsiders in a geographic 
sense appeared as a clear advantage in the interview 
situations, allowing the informants to freely express 
their experiences and concerns related to local cross-
border cooperation. Thus many of their utterances, 
consciously or subconsciously, reflected national or self-
centred positions and discourses, rather than a 
commitment to integration and cooperation. It is 
unlikely that we would have been able to elicit such 
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